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CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND THE
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Alexander M. Bickel*
"At what point," asks John Rawls in his celebrated recent book,
A Theory of Justice, to which I shall make further reference, "does
the duty to comply with laws enacted by a legislative majority...
cease to be binding in view of the right to defend one's liberties and
the duty to oppose injustice? This question involves the nature and
limits of majority rule. For this reason the problem of civil dis-
obedience is a crucial test case for any theory of the moral basis of
democracy."'
I do not, as I shall briefly indicate later on, find it possible to
accept the thesis of Professor Rawls' book. But I do agree that the
problem of civil disobedience is a critical test for any system of
government. It searches the foundations of government, moral or
other. An analysis of this problem is bound to illuminate the nature
of any system.
I have found it useful to begin such an analysis, in context
of our system, at the operational end, by asking what in fact the
legal order does about certain kinds of disobedient behavior. And I
have settled on certain terms, forms of words, to characterize certain
phenomena. Thus I will say that the legal order "makes allowance"
for disobedience when it extends an exemption to it, whether pro-
spectively or retroactively. The legal order, I will say, "takes account
of" disobedience when its response to it is not suppression through
more effective enforcement, but rather what may be called a political
response; and then the legal order can be said to "countenance"
the disobedience, and we must ask whether what we are witnessing
t This article consists of the text of the second annual address of the William 0.
Douglas Lecture Series delivered at Gonzaga University School of Law, Spokane, Wash-
ington, on February 2, 1973.
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can be viewed as the breach of a duty to obey, or whether it is not,
in truth, part of the process of law formation, even if an extra-
ordinary and risky part.
It is no simple task in our system to identify true civil dis-
obedience. That is markedly true first of all because we are-and
those who regret it in other conditions may perhaps take note of
its significance in this context-not a unitary state. We are a federa-
tion, and we have, therefore, laws within laws and laws above laws.
In this federal structure, one system of laws which is valid and fully
authoritative within itself may be called into question by appeal to
another, generally superior system; and in some measure, it works
the other way as well. This has consequences for the duty to obey
law. Thus it is possible for men to behave in a manner that is lawful,
but that is not recognized as such by the legitimate authority in
one or another place, and therefore constitutes defiance of that
authority, and causes disorder; or in a manner that may turn out
to be lawful, but at the moment violates the as yet untested law of
a given place, also of course causes disorder, and what is more,
cannot with any assurance be assumed to prove lawful in the end.
In a unitary system, most behavior of this sort would carry every
aspect of civil disobedience. It is often positively invited by the
many-tiered process of law formation that is characteristic of our
system.
In the spring of 1961, for example, groups of young people ran
some integrated buses from a border state into the deep South-
Alabama, Mississippi. These were the freedom rides, as they were
called, and they led to riots, particularly in Alabama. So serious
were the disturbances that finally President Kennedy sent in a
quasi-military force of federal marshals. Even as of 1961, the sub-
stantive federal law, statutory and constitutional, forbade as clearly
as possible the segregation of passengers in interstate travel, whether
by local statute, ordinance or administrative action, or by the private
choice of the carrier; 2 and the freedom rides were unquestionably
interstate travel. The law was clear, but in much of the South, it
was not accepted, it was not established, and it was not observed.
Such a state of the law, as we shall note further, is not unheard of,
especially but not exclusively when the law in question is formulated
and declared by the federal judiciary rather than by the Congress,
as in this instance it largely was. What was needed was the promul-
gation and application of rules and procedures of federal enforce-
2 See, e.g., Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960); Henderson v. United States,
339 U.S. 816 (1950); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 375 (1946); Mitchell v. United
States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
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ment, and that is what the freedom rides meant to and did produce,
chiefly through action by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
One might expect that the way to achieve more secure establish-
ment and more effective enforcement of the superior federal law
when it is flaunted by the other, the inferior, sovereignty of the
state is through the orderly process of litigation, or through the
political process, which can produce remedial legislation; but not
through a disorderly process of mass self-help. But in truth our
system accepts both methods, and can almost be said to offer an
incentive to the disorderly one, which looks so much like civil dis-
obedience, certainly from the local point of view. The system can
be said to offer such an incentive because jurisdictional and proce-
dural rules of litigation tend to demand a concrete controversy, show-
ing a definite, not suppositional clash between federal law and local
practice.' These are not rigid or universal rules. They by no means
exclude the possibility of successful litigation to obtain enforcement
without the need first to provoke a physical clash with recalcitrant
local authorities or otherwise to defy them. But defiant self-help is
often the surest way to invoke federal enforcement authority, and
it is at the very least not systematically discouraged.
It may not always be prudent to employ the disorderly method
of verifying the observance of federal law. There will be tension.
There will necessarily be an assault on the local legal order which
cannot be surgically limited to the locus of its pathology, the place
where it has rejected the superior federal law, but will most likely
affect some of its healthy features as well. And there may be violence.
One can readily adduce reasons for disallowing the disorderly method
of verification, and insisting on orderly processes of litigation or
political action. In this instance, indeed, Attorney General Robert
Kennedy advised against the freedom rides. But that was, within
our system, all he did or could properly do, barring only the prospect
of an emergency of catastrophic proportions. For although there is
room for prudential decisions, which government may try to influ-
ence, and although success may not be assured and the wisdom of
producing the pitched enforcement crisis may often be dubious,
nonetheless, this method of disorderly self-help in asserting rights
is legitimate and allowed for. It constitutes, itself, a right, whose
exercise has a claim to protection at the hands of federal authority
-a claim President Kennedy in fact honored. This is not civil
disobedience. It is a process of the formation of procedures and
3 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 US. 497 (1961); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court,
331 U.S. 549 (1947); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). Compare
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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machinery for the enforcement of law whose substance has been
previously declared.
The system similarly and for the same reasons invites and
countenances, and makes some though not the same degree of allow-
ance for, a disorderly, self-help method of substantive law-formation.
Historically, self-help toward the formation of substantive law will
be the prior event to the one just discussed. Conceptually, however,
for our purposes, it is posterior, because it bears a stronger resem-
blance to what by most definitions would be classified as civil
disobedience.
In February, 1960, a group of Negro students walked in and
sat at segregated lunch counters in Greensboro, North Carolina.
They were refused service, but continued to sit, quietly, perfectly
peaceably, but immovably, until they were arrested by the local
police. What they did, and this was the beginning of a movement
that spread through the South, was illegal, as a violation of the
property rights of the private lunch-counter operators, under local
laws that were valid at the time. It disturbed the peace of the
community, and it not infrequently led to violence, though seldom if
ever at the hands of the sitting-in students. The position of the
students was that while the local law was valid and enforceable
locally for the time being, it should not be, and would not long
prove to be when tested by those willing to bet on its ultimate
invalidity. This was an exercise in law-formation through exploita-
tion of the natural tension between our two co-existing systems of
law, state and federal. The risk of violence the students considered
acceptable.
In a unitary state, the sit-ins, violating as they did valid positive
law, might have been seen as an act of conscience, an appeal to
what in many systems other than ours may also be a plausible
concept-the higher law; but certainly they were an act of dis-
obedience, perhaps a revolutionary act, at war with the legal order.
In our federal system, however, the appeal to higher law is not a
call for revolutionary change, or simply some cry from the heart;
it is rather in a very practical way an appeal to existing, authorita-
tive, higher law-making institutions, almost an appeal in a technical,
legal sense. In such a system, some flouting of the local law aimed
at provoking action by the law-making institutions of a higher
sovereignty is necessarily invited, both in the nature of things, and
more particularly by the jurisdictional and procedural rules I have
mentioned.
As it happens, the sit-ins did not win their bet in the federal
courts. The Supreme Court never did declare a constitutional right
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to equal service in private places of public accommodation.4 What
the sit-ins did gain was Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1965,'
which is- a legislative creation, under the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution, of a right to service in places of public accommoda-
tion. In the meantime, hundreds of the sitting-in students had been
given various fines and jail terms pursuant to trespass or disorderly
conduct convictions in the state courts.
Had the sit-ins succeeded in obtaining a decision in their favor
from the Supreme Court, holding that segregation in private places
of public accommodation is unconstitutional, all pending convictions
would have fallen. Formal allowance would have been made for
the disorderly, self-help method of law formation employed in the
sit-ins. But the statutory law that the sit-ins in fact formed did not
automatically have the effect on the convictions that a judicial deci-
sion would have had. And yet the Supreme Court found a way, if
not without some straining. It held that the Civil Rights Act im-
plicitly forgave, abated, as if by an amnesty, convictions still
pending on appeal in sit-in cases now covered by the Act that
involved no violence.'
The conclusion to be drawn is that the unsuccessful appeal,
by the method of self-help, to a higher substantive law can be costly.
It is, when unsuccessful, nothing but civil disobedience. Whether
successful or not, however, it is, given its intent, part of the process
of law formation, and can hardly be viewed as an illegitimate breach
of a duty to obey law. It is plainly countenanced as such, at least
if peaceable; and the legal order makes allowance for it when it is
successful, and though with difficulty, and far from always, strains
to do so even when it is unsuccessful.
One remarkable example, aside from the abatement of sit-in
convictions, occurred during the Second World War in the case of
an unsuccessful self-help appeal, not against local law, but from the
federal legislature to the federal judiciary.7 After Congress passed
the Selective Service Act of 1940,8 leaders of the German-American
Bund "commanded" their members (the Bund operated on the
Fuehrer principle) to refuse military service: to register as required,
but to refuse induction. The Bund, of course, had no love for the
draft or for any other measure preparing for a possible war, obvi-
ously against Germany. But the stated and apparently quite sincerely
held ground for this "command" was the opinion of the leaders,
4 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
6 Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
7 Keegan v. United States, 324 U.S. 478 (1945).
8 Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch, 720, 54 Stat. 885.
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including the Bund's counsel, that owing to a certain provision in
it which was admittedly of very dubious validity, the entire draft
law was unconstitutional, and that resistance to it would result in
a test of its validity. The leaders were convicted of conspiring to
counsel their membership to evade service in the armed forces,
which was a crime under the draft law. The Supreme Court reversed
the conviction. The defendants' view that the draft law was uncon-
stitutional, said the Court, was "foolish." But the evidence showed
that the view was nonetheless sincerely held, and that the defendants
intended to provoke a judicial test of the validity of the law. They
did not counsel their members not to register, which would have
been the way to evade the draft "stealthily and by guile," that is,
with criminal intent. What they intended, rather, was to test their
own constitutional theory, however mistaken and indeed "foolish,"
in court. That was not evasion, and not punishable.9
These two examples of the operation of our system support,
even though they may not in themselves establish, what I suggest
is a foundation premise, namely, that our process of law forma-
tion is not just the majoritarian electoral and legislative process
supplemented by the judicial. These are, rather, stages, and not the
sole ones. They precede and follow other, less formal, more unruly
stages, in a continual round. A related, equally basic premise rests
on the insight-really the obvious observation, once attention is
drawn to it-that law as manifested in statutes, and executive,
administrative or judicial decisions is not always effective simply
because it is there, and because violators are subject to enforcement
proceedings, criminal or other.
To think that law is always effective as declared, is to forget
what the late Roscoe Pound almost 60 years ago called "the limits
of effective legal action."'" It is to forget that only in a certain
kind of social and political situation is law self-executing through
its own institutions. Actually, enactment and enforcement of law
are at times merely episodes, even if the single most important and
most influential episodes, in a long and varied process by which the
society, working through a number of institutions, manages to
realize or approximate a given purpose.
The limits of law are the limits of enforcement, and the limits
of enforcement are the conditions of a free society and perhaps,
indeed, the limits of government altogether. If substantial portions
9 Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478 (1945); see Okamoto v. United States,
152 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1946); cf. Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38 (6th Cir.
1949).
10 Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Action, 22 PA. B. Ass'N REP. 221
(1916).
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of the statute book had to be enforced by direct action, whether
through criminal or civil litigation, against large numbers of people,
we would have a very different and much more disagreeable kind
of society than we do have. Of course, a certain measure of enforce-
ment will always be necessary. And there are laws, narcotics statutes
are an example, which some people may be simply incapable of
obeying. Still a great deal of law is effectively in force, and keeping
it in force does not prevent us having a free society rather than a
police state. There are crime waves, and then they pass, as the
present one shall, and even in their midst a huge mass of law is
observed. We invest limited resources in the effort to enforce law,
and sacrifice relatively few other values in the process.
The secret of the enterprise is, of course, that most people
most of the time need only be made aware of the law in order to
obey it. They are, in truth, in a state of assent, acquiescence or
relative indifference toward each law, and in a state of acceptance
of the notion of a legal order and of the legitimacy of this one; and
so they obey. By far the better part of litigation is the consequence
of differences of opinion about what the law is or ought to be, not
of failure to obey what is clearly the law. And yet, while it may be
true that the bulk of the law is quietly effective, some important
law is not, or not readily, and instead of quiet effectiveness there
is loud disobedience.
Pound diagnosed the reason, on that occasion nearly 60 years
ago that I referred to earlier." In a simple system, he said such as
perhaps we still had in this country a century ago, when
men demand little of law and enforcement of law is but enforcement
of the ethical minimum necessary for the orderly conduct of society,
enforcement of law involves few difficulties. All but the inevitable
anti-social residuum can understand the simple program and the obvious
purposes of such a legal system. . . . On the other hand, when men
demand much of law, when they seek to devolve upon it the whole
burden of social control, when they seek to make it do the work of the
home and of the church, enforcement of law comes to involve many
difficulties. . . . The purposes of the legal system are [then] not all
upon the surface, and it may be that many whose nature is by no
means anti-social are out of accord with some or even with many of
these purposes.12
It is then, he said, that "we begin to hear complaint that laws are
not enforced and the forgotten problem of the limitations upon
effective legal action once more becomes acute."' 3
In these conditions of discord, the true alternatives are reduc-
11 Id.
12 Id. at 222.
18 Id. at 232.
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ing the opposition to a given law by placating it, or by offering it
inducements, or by persuading it; or abandoning the law. Those are
the true alternatives because the only other course of action that is
open is the massive and pervasive use of force.
That the alternatives are as I stated them is demonstrated,
among other experiences, by two notorious episodes in American
history: The substantial nullification in many places, during the
decade before the Civil War, of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850; 1 4
and Prohibition and its repeal. About the latter, it is to be remem-
bered that Prohibition was authorized by constitutional amendment.
The amendment was proposed by the necessary two-thirds vote of
the Congress, and was ratified by the legislatures of ten more states
than necessary, 46 in all. That was the kind of consensus on which
it rested initially. There was some thought that prohibition might
be unconstitutional even though enacted pursuant to a constitutional
amendment. The issue was carried to the Supreme Court by eminent
counsel, Elihu Root of New York among them. The Court held
otherwise.15 The point is that there had been not only a constitu-
tional amendment, but a favorable adjudication as well. No more
solemn and seemingly complete expression of the legal order is
imaginable. Yet within five years, Arthur T. Hadley, President
Emeritus of Yale, wrote as follows: "Conscience and public opinion
enforce the laws; the police suppress the exceptions." In this in-
stance conscience and public opinion opposed the law, he said, and
the exceptions were the rule. Hence no enforcement was possible.
The law was no law. 6 And quite right was President Hadley.
Considered as a whole, without differentiating among various
patterns of behavior that together produced the final outcome, I
think one can regard the Fugitive Slave Act and Prohibition experi-
ences as illustrations of a process of law formation-non-legislative,
non-judicial, altogether extra-legal law formation through resistance
and disobedience. In the terms I have used, the legal order must
be viewed as having taken account of the resistance and the disobe-
dience, and thus contenanced them. I have at least implied that
when the legal order takes account of disobedience and countenances
it as part of a continual process of law formation, the disobedient
cannot be viewed as having violated a duty to obey. It is, rather,
some sort of legitimate resistance. But do we not, then, find our-
selves in a circle? Does it not turn out that there is no duty to obey
so long as disobedience is widespread? There may be a duty to obey
when most of us obey, but not otherwise; which would mean that
14 Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
15 National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920).
16 A. Hadley, Law Making and Law Enforcement, 151 HARPER'S 641 (1925).
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there is no duty to obey, only the facts of obedience or disobedience,
and of the consequences the legal order may impose for the latter,
if the legal order catches one before disobedience has become so
widespread that the legal order no longer cares to catch anyone.
But analytic defeat need not be so readily accepted. It is a
fact, which no statement of a duty to obey is likely to alter, that in
our society at least, and perhaps in any system, law needs assent if
it is to be effective, and the assent to be inferred from the regular,
constitutional manner of a law's enactment and from the availability
to a new majority of the same regular, constitutional means for the
revision or repeal of the law-this inferred assent is in itself not
always sufficient. It suffices typically when, as Pound said, the law
bespeaks "the ethical minimum necessary for the orderly conduct
of society."'" It is often insufficient, as he suggested, when more is
demanded of and by law; when law is used to impose more con-
troversial and pervasive social controls.
There is recognition of this fact in the jury system. For the
jury, responding to widespread sentiment in the community, may
refuse to convict-refuse enforcement, this is to say-not because
it really believes the particular defendant innocent of the violation
with which he is charged, but because it believes that the law is a
bad law. The jury is not told it may do so, but it may and does.
Many juries did so during both the Fugitive Slave Act and Prohi-
bition episodes. And the sixth amendment requires that criminal
trials be had to juries in the state and district where the crime was
committed, thus ensuring that the relevant community sentiment will
have a chance to express itself. Prosecutors, moreover, are politically
responsive in considerable measure, and as we shall see further, have
and exercise a discretion whether or not to prosecute, which is also
informed by community sentiment.
These are facts, and they are facts that the well-advised legis-
lator takes into account in deciding whether or not to legislate, and
in assessing the continued utility of an existing law. But while the
existence of these facts must be admitted, there are still differences
between what happened to Prohibition, and what is widely happen-
ing now to anti-gambling laws, anti-marijuana laws, and certain
attempted regulations of private sexual practices on the one hand,
and what, on the other hand, we would regard as legitimate behavior
with respect to, say, the tax laws, or traffic laws, or the federal
wages and hours statute, or myriad other laws.
If the objection to prohibition or to other sumptuary and like
17 Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Action, 22 PA. B. Ass'N REP. 221, 222
(1916).
Spring, 1973]
HeinOnline  -- 8 Gonz. L. Rev. 206 1972-1973
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW
laws cannot be characterized as moral (where the objection to the
Fugitive Slave Act certainly could be), it does nevertheless rise to
a level of principle; political principle, but something more and
different than simply self-serving unwillingness to obey, or desire for
advantage, or rebelliousness; and political principle stated in terms
that not only denote assent to the legal order as such, but that seek
validation in precepts derived from the legal order's own universe of
discourse. What such principles and precepts may plausibly be will
vary from time to time. A great deal depends on the climate of
opinion. Some generations ago, live issues of political principle were
raised by infringement of property rights, which are now common
in laws regulating the economy, and even by the income tax. Today,
infringements on privacy, including some property rights, and on
personal autonomy raise such issues.
We are required to judge whether failure to observe law is
ordinary anti-social behavior, or is, rather, grounded in a plausible
claim that the law is bad on principle because it is arguably incon-
sistent with precepts or values embodied in the legal order itself.
If the latter is the case, then disobedience cannot be regarded as
simply a deplorable malfunction, which may nevertheless in fact
defeat the law, but must in many circumstances be viewed as a
legitimate part of the process of law formation, provided that it is
legitimate also in manner. The manner of disobedience was by no
means always legitimate in either the Fugitive Slave Act or Prohibi-
tion experiences.
It will be well at this point to propose a definition of civil dis-
obedience. We may say that civil disobedience is the failure to obey,
on grounds of moral or political principle, a law which is not formally
challenged as invalid; or the failure to obey a law which is itself no
more challenged as bad than as invalid, in the course of agitating for
change in public policies or actions, or social conditions, which are
regarded as bad on grounds of moral or political principle; all in
circumstances where the legal order makes no allowance for the
failure to obey. Many writers 8 insist that the act of disobedience
must be public rather than covert, and that each disobedient person
must be willing to accept the consequences of his act, that is, to
take his punishment. No doubt, if the act is public, it is more likely
to be sincere than if it is covert, but that is only a presumption on
a question of fact. The critical element is sincerity, and it is a matter
of proof. Willingness to take punishment will also tend to prove
sincerity, as well as respect for the legal order in general, but pun-
ishment may be imposed willy-nilly, and again, sincerity and respect
18 E.g., J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUsTICz 366 (1971).
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are the critical elements, not these particular ways of manifesting
them.
The full-blown Hobbesian view of the nature and foundation of
society tolerates no civil disobedience at all. Nor can the liberal
contractarian view, which legitimates government as a compact
among citizens embodying the agreement of each to abide the judg-
ment of a majority of all. The ends of government are substantially
predetermined in the liberal contractarian view, in the sense that
they are limited by timeless principles-the natural rights of the
citizen (sometimes called the rights of man; but that is a misnomer,
as the reference is really to the rights of constituent members of the
society, by birth or adhesion). The majority is allowed some margin
of error, but the premise is that it will normally act only in plausible
pursuit of the predetermined ends of government. If it should not,
says Locke, the remedy is revolution, and there is a right to use force
against the government. Short of the right of revolution, there is an
absolute duty to obey."9 Rousseau held that the people, expressing
themselves through universal suffrage, give voice to the general will,
although he allowed that they might also not. The general will is the
highest good, and when the people by majority vote give it voice, the
individual owes absolute obedience, even unto death. If at times a
minority has hold of the true general will, it follows that absolute
obedience is equally owed it. This in fact, said Rousseau, only forces
the individual to be free.'
The latest contribution to liberal contractarian theory, by Pro-
fessor John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice, is more paradoxical.
It defines the general will-called justice as fairness-in much more
detail than Rousseau, and commits government to its effectuation.
Like Rousseau, Rawls then insists on popular sovereignty, modified
only by some power in the judges to keep government within the
limits dictated by the general will. And Rawlsian theory posits a
duty to obey. But it makes allowance, one may think inconsistently,
for civil disobedience, defined as above, with the added require-
ments that the disobedience be public and that the disobedient be
willing to accept punishment. Civil disobedience is allowed because,
it turns out, justice as fairness-the general will-is not always
readily ascertainable, the majority and the judges may be wrong, or
less right than a protesting minority, and civil disobedience can play
its role in helping the entire society decide what is right. But in that
event, there is less to the prior detailed definition of justice as fair-
ness than met the eye.
19 J. LocxE, Two T TISES OF GOMMUNT 169, 233 (Hafner library ed.
1947).
20 J.J. RoussuAu, TEm SociA CoNRAcT passim (Hafner library ed. 1954).
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In the actual American legal order, ends are less permanently
predetermined than by contractarian theory, faith in majoritarianism
is less enthusiastic than Locke's or Rousseau's, readiness to have
recourse to revolution is also not as great as Locke's, and there is
little willingness to accept the righteous dictates of a minority pos-
sessed of the true general will. What is above all important is consent
-not a presumed theoretical consent, but continuous, actual consent,
born of continual responsiveness. There is popular sovereignty, and
there are votes in which majorities or pluralities prevail, but that
is not nearly all. Majorities are in large part fictions. They exist
only on election days, and they can be registered on very few issues.
To be responsive and to enjoy consent, government must register
numerous expressions of need and interest by numerous groups, and
it must register relative intensities of need and interest. For inten-
sity on the part of one group may be sufficient justification for it
to get its way when other groups, which may even constitute a
majority, are relatively indifferent. Neither the vote nor speech
sufficiently differentiate needs and interests, or express intensity.
But the bearing of dramatic ,witness through civil disobedience can
often do so.
Hence it is that civil disobedience has accompanied so many
of the most fruitful reform movements in American history. There
are the exercises in negative law formation that I have mentioned,
to which might be added the achievement, however qualified, of the
anti-war movement, then as ever quite likely a minority, in toppling
a sitting President in the midst of war, in 1968, before a single na-
tional vote had been cast. The Mexican War, incidentally, was also
attended by not a little civil disobedience. Equally if not more im-
portant have been exercises in positive law formation. There was
extensive civil disobedience for half a century in labor's struggle
for industrial democracy; the Populist movement in the South and
West engaged in civil disobedience around the turn of the century;
and so did the women's suffrage movement. 1 So, again, more re-
cently did the civil rights movement, which thus produced the Civil
Rights Act of 196422 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 2 -- two
statutes that signify more than they provide, since both have had
far-reaching indirect effects in the society at large. The Voting Rights
Act and the agitation that produced it constitute a particularly
telling episode, demonstrating that political action can produce the
right to vote; a simpler conception might lead one to believe that
only the reverse can be true, and that exercise of the right to vote
alone produces political action.
21 See, e.g., F. Alien, Civil Disobedience and the Legal Order, 36 CiNcrNNATI
L. REv. 175 (1967).
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
23 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973p (1965).
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Both statutes were the direct outcome of demonstrations, cul-
minating in a series of marches in Birmingham, Alabama, in the
spring of 1963, and in Selma, Alabama, nearly two years later.
The demonstrations were themselves peaceful, although in both
Birmingham and Selma they were met with violence. Sometimes
they were the sort of civil disobedience that the first amendment
domesticates. Often they could not be domesticated. They were just
out and out, illegal civil disobedience.
What then, are the limits of civil disobedience? What in our
system is the location of a duty to obey?
The classic statement of a duty to obey occurs in the Crito.
"[W]hether in battle or in a court of law, or in any other place,"
said Socrates, "[y]ou must do what [your] city and [your] country
order ... or [you] must change their view of what is just ...."
But not in clarity, not in economy of application, and not in the
immediacy with which the individual can affect the process of law
formation does our legal order, in most of its manifestations, re-
semble what Socrates subsumed in the Crito. We are not a city state
composed of citizens who make law when assembled for that pur-
pose, but a large, federated, representative democracy. Our law is
made by many institutions in which participation by the people is at
best attenuated, in some instances quite fictive, and in others-
namely, the judiciary--explicitly excluded. Our law, moreover, is
complex, and there are many stages in its formation and its formal
declaration. But we do approach, I suggest, the conditions of the
Crito when a final judicial decree is issued against named individuals,
following a trial to which they were parties.
In these circumstances, there is clarity, there is economy, and
there has been immediacy of participation. The process, moreover,
explicitly and insistently holds itself out as complete following ad-
judication. And it has to. No legal order could function if it had
constantly to reexamine the myriad decisions it must make in indi-
vidual cases. Finality is functionally essential in the adjudicative
process, as it is not in the judicial or legislative law-declaring pro-
cess. There is thus a contrast with both the formal position in
respect of general law, whether judicially or legislatively declared,
and with the actual experience of continuing stages in the formation
of general law after its initial declaration.
A judgment or decree, the Supreme Court has said, must be
obeyed by the parties to a case
however erroneous the action of the court may be, even if the error
24 1 THE DiAxocuEs OF PLATO 435 (B. Jowett transl. 1892) [hereinafter cited
as PLATO].
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be in the assumption of the validity of a seeming but void law going
to the merits of the case. It is for the court of first instance to deter-
mine the question of the validity of the law, and until its decision is
reversed for error by orderly review ... its orders .. . are to be
respected, and disobedience of them is contempt of its lawful author-
ity, to be punished.25
Even if it should turn out on appeal that the court had no
jurisdiction, no authority to act at all, yet it had authority to de-
cide, and to decide erroneously whether it had authority, and its
order is to be obeyed. Only when the court's claim to authority
is transparently frivolous, "when a court is so obviously travelling
outside its orbit as to be merely usurping judicial forms and fa-
cilities;" only then, in the case of an "indisputable want of authority
on the part of a court, '26 may an order be disobeyed.
When the late Martin Luther King and others, during the
1963 demonstrations in Birmingham, Alabama, on one occasion
staged a march in violation of an order issued by a local court
pursuant to a local statute which King and his friends thought
was unconstitutional-when they thus staged a march in violation
of a court order that was, as the Supreme Court was later to hold,
in fact invalid, they were punished for violating the order, and the
Supreme Court upheld the punishment.2" There was no duty to obey
the invalid statute, but there was a duty to obey the invalid court
order issued under it.
If one is not under a moral obligation to obey at this point,
then the very possibility of any legal order at all, however flexible
and responsive, however ready to reexamine and question itself, is
placed in the gravest doubt. Of course, obedience will be coerced.
In criminal cases it nearly always is. But in civil cases, in the bulk
of the occasions when regulatory law, whether statutory or judicial,
is brought home to the individual, the necessity for coercion in too
many instances would overload the circuits of the legal order. The
necessity for potentially coercive litigation with respect to a general
law that meets with resistance also overloads legal circuits Lack of
assent to, and widespread disobedience of, a general law, we have
said, may nevertheless be a legitimate way of questioning it, and of
continuing the process of law formation. The legal order will often
respond by reexamining the law, and sometimes by receding from
25 Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922). See also United States v.
United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
26 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 309, 310 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
27 Compare Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), with Shuttlesworth
v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); cf. Carroll v. President and Commissioners of
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
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it. But disobedience of a court's judgment does not question the
judgment, for it is, in theory and in practice, irreversible. Here dis-
obedience questions the very legal order itself, which must in the
end rest on something more than its power to coerce. The legal
order does rest, I believe, on an acceptance of it, as such, regardless
of errors and malfunctions. And at this, the irreducible point, that
acceptance must manifest itself, and take the form of an individual
duty to obey-voluntarily and prior to coercion.
Reading the Crito together with the Apology one finds Socrates
suggesting that he may well have been guilty of corrupting the young,
as charged. He seems to argue in parts of the Apology that he
ought, as a philosopher, to be allowed to question and to corrupt,
because a philosopher must. Yet a corrupt society, Thessaly, "where
there is great disorder and license," ''  is no place Socrates would
wish to inhabit, or propound his philosophy in. So the conviction may
be just, and the individual, in his own case, with his self-interest
fully engaged, must undertake, if he is to disobey, to pit his judg-
ment against the society's final one, delivered in his own case. Who
can trust himself, or be trusted, to be "judge in his own case-
however righteous his motives. .,29 There is heavy emphasis on
this point in the Supreme Court decisions holding that judicial orders
must be obeyed."
The conscientious objector, acting at risk against the general
command of the law, must guard against self-interest, but may fol-
low a conscience disciplined by risk, and hope to change the law.
So also the civil disobedient, who in addition does not stand alone.
But not the individual who has been judged and found guilty. If the
decree is in a civil case, and the disobedience is again undertaken
at risk because it will be punished, and is undertaken perhaps self-
lessly to protect others, then the principal, the fully explicit answer
of the Crito applies. At this stage, to disobey the complete, irrever-
sible judgment of the legal order, delivered directly, following a
trial at which he has been heard, is to deny the legitimacy of the
legal order. And who, as Socrates asked, "would [be satisfied with]
a state which has no laws?'1
But the duty of a party to a litigation to obey the judicial
judgment is not a sufficient statement of the limits of civil disobe-
dience. Not the least reason why this is so is that, without further
limits, it would be quite fair to characterize the system I have been
28 PLATO at 437.
29 Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320 (1967).
30 See Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 308-09 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
31 PLATO at 437.
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describing and praising-as John Roche once characterized it-as an
amiable anarchy resting on a foundation of cheerful nihilism. No
doubt, anarchy, real anarchy, which is seldom amiable, is the ulti-
mate destination of a course of continuous and freely permitted
civil disobedience. For civil disobedience, like law itself, is habit
forming; but the habit it forms is destructive of law. It is essential
that there be a settled custom, conceived as a duty, generally to
obey the law. It is critically important to the society that the great
bulk of law, including walk and no-walk signs, be obeyed.
Anybody who wishes responsive government, a society in which
law formation is a continual round, should never-never-simply
for the sake of convenience, cross the street against a no-walk sign.
If there is to be freedom to disobey when it matters, it can exist
only if at all other times perfect obedience is yielded. There is an
absolute duty to obey in order to make possible a society in which,
on important occasions, and without resort to revolution, the indi-
vidual may be free to disobey. These occasions, in turn, must be
few. The individual is under a duty to ration himself, and assess
a given occasion in terms of its relative as well as absolute impor-
tance, as of the given time and the given circumstances.
There must, overall, be an imbalance on the side of obedience.
This imbalance cannot be stated as a legal rule. The Rule of Law
cannot be reduced to a rule of law. But it can be stated as a moral
duty-a duty to obey law except on occasions falling within the
definition of civil disobedience that I have given; and then in light
of a responsible judgment of the absolute and relative importance of
the occasion, having regard to the overhanging threat of anarchy.
As to the manner of civil disobedience, there are three obvious
problems: violence by the civil disobedients, violence against them,
and the non-violent interference by the civil disobedients with the
justified activities and expectations of others.
The assumption of first amendment decisions is that the law
never makes allowance for violent behavior, and will even punish
activity, such as speech, which is itself for the most part inherently
non-violent, if it intentionally incites to violence. That is the point
of the clear and present danger test, even stated in its most per-
missive form. It would be difficult to maintain, however, that the
legal order does not at times take account of violence and counte-
nance it; that violence does not at times play a role in the process
of law formation. Here is an example, going back to the very begin-
nings of the Republic. When Shays' rebellion broke out, Washington
was home in Mount Vernon, retired. He gets word-this is Septem-
ber, 1786-that some 400 men, described as ragged, disreputable,
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and drunken, had threatened a court in western Massachusetts. One
rebel is reported to have cried: "I am going to give the court four
hours to agree to our terms, and, if they do not, I and my party
will force them to it.""2 The court, showing exquisite judgment,
hastened to adjourn, in order, it was said somewhat ambiguously,
"to prevent any coercive measures.""
This was, of course, a debtors' rebellion, and showed signs of
spreading. Washington, as the intelligence comes in, is very dis-
turbed. He writes his former aide, David Humphreys, in Hartford:
For God's sake tell me what is the cause of all these commotions: do
they proceed from licentiousness, British influence disseminated by the
Tories, or real grievances which admit of redress? If the latter, why
were they [the grievances] delayed until the public mind became so
agitated? If the former, why are not the powers of government tried
at once? 34
There was in fact briefly resort to force, without bloodshed. Then
the legal order responded to the grievances, meeting most of the
rebels's demands, and there was an amnesty for the rebels.
By contrast, when Washington, now President and nearing the
end of his first term, was told of the Whiskey Rebellion against
payment of the federal excise tax on liquor, in western Pennsylvania,
his reaction was quite different. This grievance had been recently
dealt with by a revision of the tax statute, and Washington's
instinct now was to proceed instantly against the rebellion. 5
And yet, though in truth the legal order will sometimes coun-
tenance it, violence must be a monopoly of the state. It is, in private
hands, whatever its possible misuses by the state, nearly always the
weapon of the strong, not of the just; of the merely numerous, not
of the righteous. Any instances of its being countenanced by the legal
order should be viewed as a malfunction.
Non-violent interference with the justified activities and expec-
tations of others often appears in a quite different light; and it is
largely what Washington confronted in both the Shays and Whiskey
Rebellions. The questions are whether the interference is with im-
portant activities and expectations, and whether it is contained and
civil, or coercive. Mobs rampaging in Boston in Fugitive Slave Act
days, or on college campuses or in Washington just a few years ago,
had different objectives in mind than segregationist mobs in Little
Rock in 1957, or on the campus of Ole Miss in 1962; but the
32 J.T. FLEXNER, GEORGE WASHINGTON 98 (1970).
33 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 370-72.
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behavior was equally intolerable in each instance, although an or-
derly march would be differently viewed, despite the inconvenience
it would also cause.
There is finally the question of violence not caused or even
provoked by civil disobedients, but predictably drawn by them
from others. As under the first amendment, the possibility of a
violent veto is no argument against activity that is otherwise legiti-
mate and tolerable. The responsibility of government is to counter
the violence at its source, not to act against its actual or intended
victims.3 The only qualification on this proposition is that in an
extreme emergency, the public force having prepared itself in good
faith to the best of its ability and having responsibly exerted itself,
the necessity may nevertheless arise to stop speech, and more readily
civil disobedience, in order to prevent a violent disaster. Even such
a lawful activity as the freedom rides may be stopped under emer-
gent circumstances of this sort.
Within limits, then, of substance, occasion and manner, civil
disobedience can be regarded as a legitimate part of our happily
varied and resourceful political process. Nobody has a right to be
disobedient; yet no one is under a moral duty never to be. Civil
disobedience, as defined, is a political action, to be undertaken rarely
and prudently. Prudence, as Burke said, "is the director, the regu-
lator, the standard" of all political and moral virtues. Like revolu-
tion, although not remotely in the same measure, every act of civil
disobedience contains, as Burke said of revolution, "something of
evil." Hence it is not lightly to be undertaken. "If ever we ought
to be economists even to parsimony, it is in the voluntary produc-
tion of evil."117
86 See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
37 E. BURKE, An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, in 5 TaE WORKS
or EDMUND BURxE 20 (World's Classics ed. 1907).
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